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Arbitration of Terms
for New Labor Contracts
Dallas M Young
The utilization of arbitration as a means of settling labor disputes
has increased greatly in recent years, especially in the interpretation of
terms of existing contracts. Professor Young concentrates on the other
category of labor disputes - the writing of new labor contracts. Three
situations are used for the author's case study: governmental boards with
all dispute-resolvmg power; publicly owned-and-operated service indus-
tries; and small, privately owned corporations. After discussing ex-
amples of the successful use of arbitration in writing terms for new
labor contracts in each of the three types of power structures, Professor
Young concludes that the full potential of arbitration in the resolution
of new contract disputes is not being realized but states that if and when
the demand for such service -ncreases, competent arbitrators are prepared
to accept the challenge.
N A SPEECH to the National Academy of Arbitrators in Janu-
ary of 1963, Secretary of Labor W Willard Wirtz stated:
Neither the traditional collective bargaining procedures nor the
present labor disputes laws are working to the public's satisfac-
tion, at least so far as the ma-
jor labor controversies are con-
THE AUTHOR (B.Ed., Southern Illinois cerned. It doesn't matter any
University, A.M., Ph.D., University of more really, how much the
Illinois) is a Professor of Economics at hurt has been real, or has
Western Reserve Umversity and a mem- been exaggerated. A decision
ber of the National Academy of Arbi-
trators, and has served as an Impartil has been made, and that deci-
Umpire for the Cleveland Transit Sys- sion is that if collective bar-
tern. gaining can't produce peace-
able settlements of these con-
troversies, the public will.'
Public demands for resolution of our strike problems are even
greater in 1966 than they were in 1963. Long and costly disputes
in the maritime and newspaper industries have disturbed many per-
sons. Shorter but aggravating stoppages by urban transit workers
and by teachers have added fuel. If strikes occur on the railroads
and on the airlines, pressures could increase rapidly for federal and
state anti-strike laws.?
I Wirtz, The Challenge to Free Collective Bargaining, in LABOR ARBITRATION AND
INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 296, 301 (Kahn ed. 1963)
2 Ed. Note: After the preparation of this manuscript, the airlines strike did occur,
and Congress did prepare a bill. However, the subsequent settlement of the strike re-
duced the pressure for Congressional action and the bill never reached a final vote.
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i ARBITRATION OF NEw-CONTRACT TERMS AS
DISTINGUISHED FROM GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION
Specialists and practitioners have been searching for new and
improved methods and techniques which will bring voluntary reso-
lutions of the disputes. In general, they have agreed that passage
of a compulsory arbitration law is not the solution. One tool which
has been under consideration, and in use, is the arbitration of "in-
terest disputes" or, preferably, of "new-contract terms."
Labor disputes have been classified into two categories. Dis-
putes involving the interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment have been termed "rights" disputes, and disputes requiring a
determination of the terms and conditions of the agreement have
been termed "interest" disputes.4
The word-combination "interest dispute" has not become well
established in the labor-arbitration and labor-relations literature of
the United States.5 Until the glossary or word-coinage specialists
come up with something better, this author suggests that the term
"interest disputes" be abandoned in favor of "new-contract terms."
In commenting about the use of arbitration to determine dis-
puted terms for new labor contracts, some writers have left the ima-
pression that it is used relatively rarely.'
8 See TROTA, I-ABOR ARBITRATION 34 (1961).
4lhubl.
5 It is not included in the indices of 1-44 Labor Arbitration Reports (1946-1965)
or in 61-1 to 65-2 Labor Arbitration Awards (1961- 1965) or in the 1961 cumulative
index for volumes 1-13 of the Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Neither Up-
DEGRAFF & McCoy, ARBITRATION op LABOR DisPUTEs (1946) nor KELLOR, AmER-
icAN ARBniRATIoN (1948Y use the term. Professors Cohen (CoHEN, IABOR LAW
(1946)) and Gregory (GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW (2d rev. ed. 1961)) also
do not employ the term. A spot check with seven (six lawyers and one economist)
of the thirteen Cleveland, Ohlo members of the National Academy of Arbitrators
showed that five had never heard "interest dispute' used in reference to labor arbitra-
tions, that one guessed it might be a dispute over whether interest should be required
in back-pay awards, and that another had heard the term employed once in the context
used by Trotta. See text accompanying notes 3 & 4 supra. See Handsaker, Arbitation
and Contract Disputes, in CHALLENGES TO ARBITRATION 78 (McKelvey ed. 1960).
Without becoming involved in a contention of words, the highly respected arbitra-
tor and lawyer, Professor Robert E. Mathews, wrote that grievance arbitration was
a very different matter from the arbitration of new contract terms. The ques-
tion for the arbitrator, or arbitration board in "grievance arbitration" is not
what the terms of the parties' relationship should be but what they are under
the contract already in effect. LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 361 (Math-
ews ed. 1953).
Furthermore, the frequently cited Bureau of National Affairs' Labor Arbitration Re-
ports includes selected cases under the classification of "Amendment, termiation, or
reopening of contracts and terms in new contracts." 1-20 Lab. Arb. 5 94.109 (1946-
SMProfessor Maurice S. Trotta stated that 95% of the issues which were arbitrated
1953); 20-44 Lab. Arb. Awards S 94.102 (1954-1966).
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A high percentage of cases falling in one of two dassifications
may be an eye-catching statistic, but it must be used with care. Pro-
fessor Maurice S. Trotta's ninety-five per cent figure for "rights"
disputes may have been true in 1961. 7  Was it so high twenty years
earlier? Did it reflect a normal growth which followed an extreme-
ly important earlier breakthrough? Could Professor Morrison
Handsaker have been asking whether our experience with the arbi-
tration of new-contract terms is of greater significance than the num-
bers suggest?8
Will the demands of the years immediately ahead place new
emphasis on the arbitration of terms for new labor contracts? If so,
where can we look for guidance?
II. CASE STUDIES ON ARBITRATION OF NEw
LABOR CONTRACTS
Researchers and practitioners may gain Insights from the dis-
cussion which follows. Three types of situations are discussed. The
first deals with an all dispute-resolving power; the second concerns
a publicly owned-and-operated service industry; and the third deals
with a small, privately owned corporation. The following three
case studies on past implementation of new-contract term arbitra-
tion are intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive; more at-
tention will be given to the first two situations.
A. Governmental Use - the Natzonal War Labor Board
Let it be admitted from the start that the National War Labor
Board (NWLB) was not an arbitration board, as such. It was far
were "rights" not "interest" disputes. TROTrA, op. cit. supra note 3, at 34. Mathews
wrote:
This has been the practice in the local transit industry for many years. But
this is not a general practice, and there is still, except in the Fast, compara-
tively little resort to arbitration in the settlement of new contract disputes.
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW, 361 (Mathews ed. 1953)
Handsaker, on the other hand, observed that
Although the general attitudes of unions and management is a negative one,
often including the view that "you just can't and don't arbitrate contract
cases," there has been, nevertheless, over the years a small but, it seems to me,
fairly signigicant number of contract cases being arbitrated. Many of these
were in transit and public utilities but significant numbers occurred also in
retail trade, painting and publishing, and textiles. It is noted that contract
arbitration has been used most in industries where the product is transitory
and where the loss of markets brought about by strikes is often irretrievable.
Although there has been a decline in recent years in its use in transit and
printing, there are nevertheless a fair number of cases in these and a variety
of other industries. See Handsaker, supra note 5, at 81.
7 See note 6 supra.
s Ibid.
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more, in that it was a presidentially appointed, and later congres-
sionally empowered, body which made and administered policies on
labor disputes and wage stabilization. In the almost four years of
its existence, this semi-judicial body undoubtedly ruled on and wrote
more terms for new labor contracts than any organization before or
since its existence.
(1) Environment in Which the Board Was Created.-After
the outbreak of World War H in Europe and before the entry of
the United States into the war, there was an increase in the number
of strikes. President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Nation-
al Defense Mediation Board (NDMB) on March 19, 1941." Em-
phasis was placed on mediation efforts to assist the parties in their
negotiations; to investigate, conduct hearings, and make findings
of fact; and to formulate recommendations for the settlement of
disputes."0 The Mediation Board could also make public its findings
and recommendations if it is so desired.' Such services were ren-
dered only after strikers went back to work - an unprecedented
policy, according to Chairman William H. Davis.'2 The tripartite
NDMB was made inoperative when the labor members withdrew
after the board refused to order a union shop in the captive-mines
dispute.'
3
Ten days after Pearl Harbor was bombed, on December 17,
1941, the President invited twenty-four representatives of labor and
management to confer in Washington. From this conference came
agreement on three basic points: (1) there should be no strikes or
lockouts for the duration of the war; (2) all labor disputes should
be settled by peaceful means; and (3) the President should set up
a War Labor Board to handle all disputes.' 4 On January 12, 1942,
Executive Order 9017'5 abolished the National Defense Mediation
Board and established the National War Labor Board (NWLB).
Upon its twelve members - four each from labor, management and
the public - was placed the responsibility for rendering final deci-
sions on unresolved labor disputes."6
9 Exec. Order No. 8716, 6 Fed. Reg. 1532 (1941).
10 1 NWLB TERMINATION REP. 5-7 (1947)
" Ibd.
12 Davs, Introductory Statements to U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1 NWLB TERMINATION
REP. xiii (1947).
13 See YOUNG, UNDERSTANDING LABOR PROBLEMS 421 (1959)
'4 mbd.
15 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (1942).
16 By December 31, 1945, the NWLB disposed of 20,800 dispute cases involving
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In contrast to its predecessor, NWLB decisions were made by
unanimous action, if possible; otherwise decisions were made by a
majority vote."
(3) Controversy Regarding Its Compostton.-TripartAiusm
was both criticized and defended. Some said that an all-public
board could have made decisions much more quicdy and efficiently
and that the tune and effort which were spent in attempting to
reconcile differences could have been given to more constructive
ends. Dr. Taylor disagreed:
In my judgment, the tripartite composition was virtually indispen-
sable to a Board charged with the responsibility for finding an-
swers to a host of problems which came before it and for which
no precedents were available. The agreement that all labor dis-
putes were to be settled by the Board gave it a jurisdiction not
only over wages, hours, and working conditions under an un-
precedented economic situation but also over certain organiza-
tional questions, jurisdictional disputes, union security, and many
other like issues. Some of these issues had commonly been con-
sidered to be non-arbitrable. Yet they were to be settled by the
War Labor Board during the war without recourse to strikes or
lockouts. It soon became apparent that the work of the Board
centered about solving problems rather than determining argu-
ments. 18
12.5 million employees. Garrison, Introductory Statements to U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1
NWLB TERMINATION REP. xii (1942).
The contribution of the NWLB in maintaining industrial peace is sufficiently im-
portant to warrant brief introductions of the public members: William H. Davis, At-
torney-at-law, Chairman; George W Taylor, Professor of Economics, University of
Pennsylvania, Vice-chairman; Frank P. Graham, President, University of North Caro-
lina; and Wayne L. Morse, Dean of the School of Law, University of Oregon. Each
man was experienced in labor relations. Chairman Davis had served as a member of
the President's emergency board under the Railway Labor Act in 1937, as a member of
the presidentially appointed committee which investigated labor relations in England
and Sweden in 1938, and as chairman of the NDMB. Vice-chairman Taylor, while
serving on the faculty of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, had been
impartial chairman for the hosiery industry and impartial umpire for General Motors
and the United Automobile Workers. President Graham had served on the National
Advisory Council on Social Security and had shown keen interest in labor relations in
the South. Dean Morse had been arbitrator for the maritime industry on the west coast
and had handled disputes in the lumber and paper-products industries of the Northwest.
The success of the NWLB depended, in a large measure, on the integrity and ability
of these men - two lawyers and two academic nonlawyers. See YOUNG, op. cst. supra
note 13, at 422.
17 Chairman Davis stated it thusly"
There were significant, and even crucial, cases in which the decision by the
Board was by majority action, with the labor members or the industry mem-
bers united in vigorous dissent. But from the beginning, all members of the
Board accepted majority rule. After the deciding vote the minority in every
case joined with the majority making the Board's decision effective. It was
the unswerving adherence to this democratic rule that made the tripartite
Board a truly effective instrument of voluntary self government. Davis, supra
note 12, at xiv-xv.
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(4) Issues Faced by the Board.-Twenty-eight volumes of War
Labor Reports" contain decisions and materials relating to terms for
new labor contracts20 From this large reservoir of experience and
information only a limited number of issues need be mentioned,
each of which has amazing timeliness more than twenty years later.
(a) Unon Securty.-The wide gap between managements' de-
sire to keep an open shop and the unions' wish for a dosed shop
gave rise to many and varied solutions. At the time of the Bitumr-
nous Coal Operators' (Captwe Coal Mines) case,2' President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt said: "I tell you frankly that the Government of
the United States will not order nor will Congress pass legislation
ordering a so-called dosed shop."22  Notwithstanding the Presi-
dent's statement, a presidentially appointed arbitration board, with
Dr. John R. Steelman serving as chairman, granted a union shop 8
NWLB decisions on union security, however, did not go beyond
maintenance of membership. Three cases demonstrate the evolution
of that policy. In Marshall Field & Co."4 the Board ordered the
parties to execute a contract which provided
(1) that, as a condition of employment, present and future mem-
bers of union who individually authorize in writing check-off of
dues shall remain members of union in good standing; (2) that
company will not interfere with right of employees to join or en-
gage in union activities or discriminate against or coerce employees
because of union membership; and (3) that union will not coerce
any employee into joining union or will not engage in union ac-
tivities on company time and property.25
In Ryan Aeronautical Co.,2 the public members almost obtained
unanimity of the Board on the inclusion of a maintenance of mem-
bership provision by creating a fifteen-day escape period before the
effective date of the rule. In Little Steel Cases" the majority
38 Taylor, Introductory Statements to U. S. Dep't of Labor, 1 NWIB TiUINATiON
REP. xvii (1947).
19 See 1-28 WAR LAB. REP. (1942-1946).
20Topics range from A to W (Absenteeism to Work Standards), and industries
covered range from A to Z (Advertising to Zinc)
21 No. AS-2023 (Nov. 11, 1941).
221 NWLB TRmwATION RBP. 82 (1947).
2 31d. at 82 n.5. Coal industry board members dissented.
24 1 WAri LAB. REP. 47 (1942). The board vote was 6-5, with one industry mem-
ber concurring and another dissenting.
251bu2.
201 NWLB TERMINATION REP. 85 (1947). Two of the four industry members
concurred and two dissented.
271 WAR LAB. REP. 325 (1942).
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opinion, industry dissenting, explained the reasons for the main-
tenance of membership provision.
In this case the Board protects the rights of the majority and the
minority, rejects the union's demand for a union shop and com-
pulsory check-off, and rejects the companies' demand for no change
in present union status. The Board decides in favor of the volun-
tarily accepted maintenance of membership and check-off of those
members of the union who are in good standing on the fifteenth
day after this directive order, or who may thereafter voluntarily
join the union. This provision is not a closed shop, is not a union
shop, and is not a preferential shop. No old employee and no new
employee is required to join the union to keep his job. If in the
union, a member has the freedom for 15 days to get out and keep
his job. If not in the union, the worker has the freedom to stay
out and keep his job. This freedom to join or not to join, to stay
in or get out, with foreknowledge of being bound by this clause
as a condition of employment during the term of the contract pro-
vides for both individual liberty and union security.28
(b) Wage Stabilizatton.-Even before the responsibility for
stabilizing wages had been given to the NWLB, it rendered a key
decision in July of 1942. By an 8-4 vote, with labor dissenting,
the foundation was laid on which the wage stabilization superstruc-
ture was built following congressional passage of Public Law 72929
and Executive Order No. 9250."° A second part of the Lttle Steel
Cases"' contained this statement:
For several years prior to January 1, 1941, wages and cost of liv-
ing were relatively stable. Wage rates and prices did change, but
within narrow limits. Earnings had, therefore, a rather constant
purchasing power. Workers knew pretty well what their money
would buy. Early in 1941, both wage rates and cost of living
started to move upward. By May, 1942, the cost of living
index had risen by approximately fifteen per cent.32
Since the steelworkers had had increases of 11.2 per cent between
January, 1941, and May, 1942, they were given an additional 3.2
per cent8 3
In spite of the fact that the nation's cost-of-living index moved
up slowly - an additional fifteen per cent between July, 1942, and
August, 1945 - the NWLB refused to allow wage adjustments
28 1 NWJ3 TERMINATION REP. 87 (1947)
29 Tit. A, sec. 1, 77th Cong., 1942.
807 Fed. Reg. 7871 (1942). See YOUNG, oP. cit. supra note 13, at 425-26.
811 WAR LAB. RaP. 325 (1942)
32 Directives, Orders and Opinions of the National War Labor Board in the "Little
Steel' case at 16, July 16, 1942.
33 Ib4. The opinion was written by the economist member of the Board.
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under the escalator principle. The public and management mem-
bers had insisted that further wage increases would have resulted in
higher prices and more inflation. Their labor counterparts some-
times suggested that the continued use of the "IAttle Steel" formula
was inaccurate - the word should have been spelled steal.
(c) Fringe Benefits.-While the NWLB was holding the line
on wages, it received an increased number of disputes over fringe
benefits. Gradually, policies were developed and effectuated which
have had a continuing impact on our economy. The vacation issue
is an example. Prior to World War II short vacations with pay
were common for salaried workers, but few hourly paid employees
were given time off - even without pay. In Phelps Dodge
Corp.,)4 the union demanded "a full 7-day vacation with pay for an
average week's earnings.""5 The company insisted that the policy
which it had introduced in its plants in 1940 and 1941 (a three-
day vacation for employees who had been with the firm more than
one but less than two years, four days for those who had been there
from two to three years, and five days vacation for employees of
three years or longer) should not be changed. " By the end of the
war, approval of vacation clauses of "one for one to five and two
for five years or more'"7 was virtually automatic in both dispute
and voluntary cases. Board members believed
that vacations should be taken if possible, since they increase the
physical well-being and morale of workers, thereby leading to in-
creased production. However, the Board recognized that war pro-
duction requirements would not always permit workers to take
time off for vacations. For this reason, employers were permitted
to pay workers a bonus equivalent to their vacation pay in lieu
of a vacation period in spite of the contention by many employers
that such a payment was in reality a wage increase. The Board
took the position that the establishment of the vacation principle,
regardless of whether vacations could actually be taken, was the
primary consideration.8s
(d) Grevance Procedure.-Among the many terms written by
the NWLB for new labor contracts were those which set up and
gave power to grievance procedures. Strikes and lockouts which
resulted from disputes over existing contract clauses or disciplinary
341 WAR LAB. REP. 29-35 (1942).
351ld. at 33.
36 Ibp.
3 7 Ths is a customary expression among economists used to describe the ratio be-
tween weeks of vacation and years of employment.
38 1 NWLB Tmu1NAxiON RPE. 348-49 (1947)
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actions could be just as serious and long-lasting as those over new
contracts. Consistent with its charge to resolve all disputes by
peaceful means, the Board wrote into some contracts provisions for
grievance procedures, one of which was arbitration. In such in-
stances, the NWLB's progeny arbitrator was not given the new-
contract-writing power of its parent. In Reynolds Metal Co.,3"
August 29, 1942, the Board ruled that the new contract (written
by the NWLB) must include the following provision:
All disputes, differences, and grievances between the parties aris-
ing under the terms of this agreement, but not including any de-
sired or proposed changes in other terms of this agreement
shall upon written notification by either party to the other, prompt-
ly be submitted to arbitration. 40
Almost a year later, in Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg Co.,41 a deci-
sion stated that "It is agreed that any differences arising incident to
negotiations of terms of a new agreement are not covered by this
section, the sole purpose of which is to make grievances arising out
of and during the term of this agreement subject to arbitration."42
B. Use of New-Contract Term Arbitration %n Public Industry
The Cleveland Transit System is a publicly owned-and-operated
business which has had a very long tradition, sometimes disturbing
and sometimes distinguished, in the arbitration of terms and new la-
bor contracts in the urban transit industry. As a matter of fact, the
industry has also made frequent use of old-contract-term grievance
and discipline arbitrations."
392 WA.R LAB. REP. 496 (1943)
401d. at 497
41 10 WAR LAB. REP. 367-74 (1944)
4 2 1d. at 368.
4 3 Whea speaking of most industries it would be naive, if not ridiculous, to credit
one person with the growth of arbitration. This is not so in urban transit. William
D. Mahon - who served for 52-V years as international president of the Amalgamated
Transit Union prior to his retirement in 1946 - was the chief advocate and architect
of the judicial-like method of resolving labor disputes. See Young, Fifty Years of Labor
Arbitratfon n Cleveland, 83 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 464 (1960)
Professor Alfred Kahn wrote that Mahon held a strong conviction that his umon
should settle all possible disputes without causing the public to suffer the inconvenience
of a strike, and he fought consistently to make and keep arbitration the "cornerstone"
of the union. At an early date the International constitution was drawn so that no au-
thorized strike could be called by any local division until after it had offered to arbitrate.
Although this provision has by no means eliminated strikes by the Amalgamated it has,
along with the attitude of the leadership, led to a large number of arbitrations in the
industry and to a relatively low strike rate. KUHN, ARBITRATION IN TRANSIT 5
(1952) No one on the company side exercised such pro-arbitration influence. Even
though the management associations in the industry looked with favor on arbitration,
the resolution of labor disputes remained in the province of the individual company.
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Examination of labor-relations agreements in sixteen of the na-
tion's largest cities44 shows that all have some kind of terminal ref-
erence point. Some systems use arbitration sparingly and only for
resolving personal grievances; others submit contract-interpretation
disputes with the specific limitation that the arbitrator has no power
to add to, subtract from, or modify the existing agreement; and
only a very small number provide for arbitration of terms for new
contracts.45
For sixty years Cleveland has given its arbitration boards and
its impartial umpires the power to rule on existing-contract disci-
pline and on new-contract disputes.4" In practice, if not in theory,
the city has invested the appointees with power which is probably
unmatched in the urban transit industry and in few, if any, other
4 4 Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City,.
Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Lotus,
and Seattle.
45 See Young, supra note 43, at 465.
46 On December 22, 1906, the Cleveland Electric Railway Company (one of several
predecessors of the Cleveland Transit System) entered into a labor-relations agreement
with the Amalgamated, Division 268. The agreement contained the following pro-
visions:
Section 2. The Company agrees to meet and treat with the duly accredited
officers and committees of the Association upon all questions arising between
them and should any dispute arise between them, which cannot be mutually
adjusted, the same shall be submitted, at the request of either party, to the
Board of Arbitration as provided for in this agreement, and, during such sub-
mittal, the conductors and motormen shall continue the operation of the com-
pany's cars.
Section 3. For the purpose of settling disputes which cannot be mutually
adjusted between the company and the Association, there shall be selected a
Board of Arbitration composed of three disinterested persons, one to be chosen
by the Company, one to be chosen by the Association, and the two, thus se-
lected, to select the third arbitrator, the finding of the majority of said Board
of Arbitration to be final and binding upon the parties hereunto. Either party
hereunto shall name its arbitrator within fifteen days after having received
written notice from the other party hereunto, and either party failing to so
name its arbitrator, shall forfeit its case.
The two arbitrators selected by the parties hereunto shall meet from day
to day, after their selection, for the purpose of selecting the third arbitrator,
and, after a period of ten days, if the third arbitrator has not been selected,
the representatives of the company and the representatives of the Association,
with the two arbitrators selected, shall meet and see if it is not possible to
agree upon a third arbitrator, and make such other arrangements concerning
the arbitration as they deem advisable. If no agreement as to the durd ar-
bitrator can be reached within ten days after the matter has been referred to
the representatives of the company and the association, then the third arbitra-
tor is to be appinted by the Judge of the United States Court of the district
in which Cleveland is situated.
Each party hereunto shall bear the expense of the arbitrator of its own
selection and the parties hereunto shall jointly pay the third arbitrator. This
portion of the agreement was reproduced from the original in the files of the
Cleveland Transit System.
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industries. Even though the 1942 Cleveland city charter has re-
tamed in the Transit Board the ultimate right to review, amend, or
reject the umpire's decisions, not one of the decisions has been modi-
fied or overruled.
(1) Ad Hoc, Trzpartite Boards.-Between 1906 and 1942 -
while transit in Cleveland was privately owned but publicly regu-
lated - disputes resolved by ad hoc boards included six on wages,
one on scheduling, and two on discipline."
(a) Wages.-Disputes over wages were referred to arbitrators
in 1910, 1923, 1924, 1934, 1936, and 1942. In the 1910 dis-
pute the arbitration board, consisting of a judge and certain mem-
bers of labor and management, considered only the wage rate and
unanimously recommended a wage increase.4" By startling contrast,
the 1924 arbitration dealt with almost everything.49 In that dis-
pute the Cleveland Railway Company (another CTS predecessor)
invoked arbitration on wages and working conditions. The union,
Amalgamated, Division 268, demanded that the arbitration board
be increased from three to five members. While the five-man board
was weighing the evidence, one of the company members on the
arbitration board charged that the chairman was biased and an-
nounced that the company would not abide by the decision. This
member asked for the appointment of a new board and withdrew
from further discussions. The chairman and two labor members
awarded a twelve cent increase and a paid time-allowance of fifteen
minutes for completing accident reports.5" Strike threats were met
with temporary restraining orders. The litigation ended when the
Supreme Court of Ohio refused to review a lower court decision
which declared the award null and void because the board had
ordered a closed shop and because there had been fraud."' For nine
years the company refused to recognize the union. Thereafter, how-
ever, other wage issues were arbitrated. 2
(b) Scheduling -Typical of the non-wage arbitrations was
one which involved layover time.53 The contract stipulated that
47 From the files of the Cleveland Transit System (unpublished)
48 Ibd.
49 lbut.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 See Young, supra note 43, at 466-67
53 Ibid.
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"All schedules shall be arranged so as to give not less than a four-
minute layover at the end of each trip."54  On a particular line the
board found that despite an honest endeavor by the motormen and
conductors to run on schedule, eight out of ten trips were not com-
pleted in time to allow the four minute layover. By unanimous
action the board ruled that two runs should be added to the sched-
ule, and this was done."5
(c) Discpline.-Only two discipline cases were referred to
arbitration between 1910 and 1942.56 In 1913 four men were
charged,"' but only one was found guilty. The board ruled unam-
mously that the punishment was not unreasonable.5" In 1924 an
employee was discharged for "turning over found money to a dam-
ant on his car, thereby breaking a company rule."59  The arbitra-
tors "found that no evidence of dishonesty was apparent but that
indiscretion was shown and recommended reinstatement . . . and
as a disciplinary measure that no pay be allowed for the period since
his discharge."6
0
(2) Federal Labor Boards.--Durng both world wars transit
disputes in the United States, as well as disputes in other industries,
were resolved by War Labor Boards.
(a) War Labor Board I.-During 1918 a far-reaching, new-
labor-contract decision 61 was rendered by a board co-chaired by Wil-
liam Howard Taft" and by Frank P Walsh."3 A thirteen cent per
hour increase was approved for motormen and conductors (increas-
ing the hourly rate from thirty-five to forty-eight cents). Premium
pay was to be allowed when swing or split shifts were not com-
pleted within fourteen hours.' Sunday and holiday runs were to be
54 Ibui.
5 5 See Young, supra note 43, at 465-66.
5 Ibd.
57 The record does not indicate what charges had been made against the men.
58 See Young, supra note 43, at 466.
59 Ibd.
60 Ibid.
31 Employees v. Cleveland Ry., Docket No. 31, N.W.L.B. (July 31, 1918).
62 At this time Mr. Taft was the former President of the United States; he was later
to become Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
03 Mr. Walsh was subsequently a United States Senator. He is noted for his activity
in the realm of wage and hour legislation.
6 4 The formula for computing the premium pay provided for fifteen minutes for
the fifteenth hour, thirty minutes for the sixteenth hour, forty-five minutes for the sev-
enteenth hour, and sixty minutes for the eighteenth and successive hours.
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straight runs of not more than eight hours. Significantly, and with
irony which is amazingly timely even after the New York City
transit strike in 1966, the board's opinion stated that
The wages provided for in this award are a very substantial in-
crease from the rates now paid. The street railway is operated
under a contract for service at cost in which the fare was advanced
from 3 cents to 4 cents upon the auditor's showing. [U] nless
the fares are increased, the company will not be able to meet the
great increase of operating expenses.
We have recommended to the President that special congres-
stonal legislatton be enacted to enable some executive agency of
the Federal Government to consider the very perilous financial
condition of this and other electric street railways of the country,
and raise fares in each case in which circumstances require it.65
The Taft-Walsh board, with the help of the United States De-
partment of Labor, also mediated a "battle of the sexes."6 In spite
of increased wages the company said that it could not find enough
men to operate its cars. On August 27, 1918, female conductors
were hired. The union, Amalgamated, Division 268 protested. On
September 4, the union served notice that if the women were not
removed that same day the men would strike. When a committee
for investigation was appointed, service continued. On September
21, the committee reported that the labor market was not so tight
as to necessitate the use of women conductors and recommended that
they be removed by November 1. The women appealed to War
Labor Board I (WLB) and to the union. The termination date was
delayed to December 1. On threat of a male strike, the WLB
ordered the women removed by January 3, 1919, and the women
again appealed. The board ruled in March of 1919, that women
be allowed to continue work.67 Yet both the company and the un-
ion refused to comply. Apparently the pressure for women's suf-
frage, which had been so strong in the nation's capitol that it was to
have won passage of the nineteenth amendment only several months
later, had not made much of an impact on the hinterland."s
(b) War Labor Board !!.-During the period immediately
after our entry into World War II, negotiations for both a new
labor contract and for the purchase of the transit system by the city
were under way. Arbitrator Aaron Horvitz, a famed New York
65 Employees v. Cleveland Ry., Docket No. 31 N.W.LB. 2-3 (July 31, 1918).
(Emphasis added.)
66 From the files of the Cleveland Transit System (unpublished)
67 bid.
68 See Young, supra note 43, at 468.
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attorney, was serving as chairman of an ad hoc committee when the
sale was effectuated. On May 20, 1942, the Horvitz board had
awarded a twelve and one-half cent per hour increase;69 the prede-
cessor company had paid the increased wages for the period March
1 through April 28.70 Cleveland officials decided that the city, as
new owner of the system, could not enter a contract with a union
and refused to give legal force and effect to the arbitration award.
But to avoid a strike, the Cleveland city council allowed a ten cent
increase on July 10 and on October 5 granted the additional two and
one-half cent increase.7 A court of appeals held that the award
was a contractual liability of the city and that the employees should
receive retroactive pay from April 29.7
In 1944 an advisory opinion was sought from War Labor Board
II." Accordingly, the regional board recommended a two and one-
half cent increase for two-man operations but no increase for one-
man operations. Premium pay of one-half time was granted opera-
tors who worked a seventh consecutive day. Overtime pay for all
actual working time after forty-four hours per week and for spreads
over eleven-and-one-half hours per day were also approved.74
(3) Single, Impartzal Umpores.-The City of Cleveland pur-
chased the transit system in 1942."5 After a short operating expe-
rience under the Division of Municipal Transportation, Department
of Public Utilities, the city charter was amended so as to place re-
sponsibility for supervision, management, and control in a transit
board.7" Furthermore, the amended charter provided that
the salary or compensation of employees under the transit system
shall be in accordance with the prevailing rates of salary or com-
pensation for services rendered under similar conditions of em-
ployment and of vacation, sick leave, and retirement for like, em-
ployment in industry generally and without reference to other de-
partments or divisions of the city of Cleveland 7
6 9 From the files of the Cleveland Transit System (unpublished).
70 oTd.
71 Ibu.
72 See Young, supra note 43, at 467
73 Young, sapra note 43, at 468.
74 Ibid.
7 5 Official Statement, Relating to the Sale of the Cleveland Transportation System
(March 31, 1942) in the files of the Cleveland Transit System.
7 6 Report on Amendment to City Charter Establishing the Cleveland Transit Board,
in the files of the Cleveland Transit System.
77CHARTmER OF TE Ciy oF CLBvELAND ch. 29 (1951)
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While some metropolitan systems have searched for reasons why
their employees should not be permitted to organize and bargain
collectively, Cleveland's transit board permitted it. Because there
was some question in Ohio about a public body entering into a con-
tract with a union, the problem was resolved by calling the negoti-
ated terms "conditions of employment."
Shortly after the impartial umpire system was installed, Cleve-
land Transit System's (CTS) General Manager, Walter J. McCar-
ter7" explained to a meeting of the American Transit Association
that the
impartial umpire must be agreed upon at least 45 days prior
to the submission of any wage demand or demands for change in
conditions. He is paid a retainer [annual], and it is his duty
to become acquainted with the peculiarities of the transit indus-
try [whether] he ever hears a dispute or not. Any decision
that he makes he has to live with in the community. If he
makes a decision that makes necessary an adjustment in fare, it
is his responsibility to tell the public that this decision did cause
that particular situation.79
In the same speech, McCarter stressed the importance of responsible
bargaining prior to resorting to arbitration."
To protect against an impulsive dispute followed by immediate
submission to the arbitrator, any grievance over contract interpre-
tation or discipline could not be submitted to the impartial umpire
until ten days after the dispute arose. Umon demands for increased
wages and changed conditions in new contracts would have to be
given to the company sixty days prior to submission to the umpire.
In addition, the parties would have to bargain the dispute for thirty
days before reference to the umpire."'
Eight single umpires (seven attorneys and an economist) have
served as CTS arbitrators since January 1, 1946. Terms have ranged
from five months to five years. The following tabulation summar-
izes activities under the impartial umpire system.82
78 Mr. Carter subsequently served in a similar capacity with the Chicago Transit
System.
79 Proceedings of the American Transit Association 175-76 (1946). See Young,
supra note 43, at 469.
80 Ibtl.
81 Young, supra note 43, at 469.
82 Compilation from records of the Cleveland Transit System. See Young, supra
note 43, at 470.
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ARBITRATION BY CTS UMPnus
Contract
Period of Service Discipline Interpre- New
Disputes tion Contract
(1) Jan. 1, 1946-Apr. 15, 1950 ---- 0 13 1946
1947
1949
(2) Apr. 16, 1950-Apr. 15, 1953 0 1 1952
(3) Nov. 15, 1953-Apr. 15, 1956 -- 0 0 1955
(4) Apr. 16, 1956-Apr. 15, 1961 __ 0 1 1956
(5) Nov. 1, 1961-Apr. 15, 1963 --- 0 1 -
(6) Apr. 16, 1963-Apr. 15, 1964 __ 0 0 1963
(7) Nov. 12, 1964-Apr. 15, 1965 0 2 -
(8) Apr. 16, 1965-Apr. 15, 1966 --- 0 1 1965
If the predominant pattern for labor arbitration in the United
States includes large numbers of discipline and contract interpreta-
tions and almost no new-contract terms, CTS is surely the excep-
tion. In twenty years, there have been no discipline cases reaching
the umpire. Between 1946 and 1950' there were thirteen arbitra-
tion cases involving interpretations of existing contract sections, but
there have been only six of these since 1950.84 By startling con-
trast, only three of eleven new contracts since 1946 have been
negotiated by the parties; the eight others resulted from actions by
the impartial umpires.8 5
It should not be concluded that because there have been no dis-
charge cases and relatively few existing-contract disputes reaching the
arbitrator that there have been no such grievances. In 1959, for ex-
ample, grievances reaching the Director of Personnel " or beyond in-
cluded ten discharges which arose because of such issues as poor ac-
cident record, unbecoming conduct with passengers, absences, and
intoxication. Seven of these discharge grievances were denied, but
three of the aggrieved workers were reinstated.87 Twelve contract
interpretation disputes were heard involving such matters as indi-
vidual wage rates and job classifications, scheduling, vacations,
seniority, and local working conditions. Three of these grievances
8 3 During this period, the umpire retainer contract permitted the parties to utilize
the umpire's services for twenty days per year without any additional cost. The parties
readily took advantage of this provision.
84 In 1950 the fixed annual payment under the retainer contract was reduced from
$5,000 to $3,000, but the per diem payment began with the first day, rather than with
the twentieth day.
8 5 See Young, supra note 43, at 470.
86 The Director of Personnel is step number three m the grievance procedure. No
record is maintained of grievances failing to reach this third step.
87 Compilaton prepared at the request of the author. See Young, supra note 44,
at 472.
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were denied. The others were adjusted satisfactorily or carried into
1960.88
Attention is directed to three decisions of the impartial umpires:
one (1949) because it resulted in a five-day strike, the longest in
the system's history; the second (1956) because its wage decision
brought a small amount of immediate criticism from the union and
none from the company"9 and because it contained a reduction of
sick leave pay; and the third (1965) because of the larger number
of issues on which the arbitrator wrote the terms for the new con-
tract.
Paradoxically, the longest Cleveland transit strike occurred in
1949 over conflicting interpretations of an umpire's decision on the
vacation dause. The walkout started at madnight December 22,
1949 9 If possible, the wrath of the retail industry in particular
was even stronger than it was during the New York transit strike in
January of 1966. The stoppage was called by the union president
even though a strike should not have occurred since Ohio had a no-
strike-by-public-employees law. The union president appeared be-
fore the court and was ordered to tell the men to return to work.
The president complied, but the workers did not resume work.
Nevertheless, no one was jailed; the chief aim was to restore service,
so men were back at work on December 27 91 There is reason to
believe that "clearing the air," while inconvenient and disturbing
at the time, contributed much toward mature bargaining and better
use of the arbitration process in the 1950's and 60's.
In the 1956 dispute,92 after fifteen days of hearings during
which the parties introduced 110 exhibits on wages and 105 on
other issues, the umpire recommended the following solution:
(1) a two-year agreement; (2) a wage increase of six cents per
hour for the first year and six cents plus cost-of-living adjustments
for the second; (3) inclusion of a dues checkoff provision; (4) re-
duction of sick leave from eight to six hours per day to reduce
abuses which, because of modified federal income tax laws, had
made possible greater take-home earnings for being sick than for
,88 Ibid.
89 However, at the start of the second year the reactions were reversed.
90 See Krsslov, The Cleveland Transit Strike of 1949, 13 PERSONNEL ADMINIS-
TRATION 25 (Nov. 1950)
91 Ibid.
92 From the files of the Cleveland Transit System (unpublished)
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working; and (5) reopening of discussions at the end of the first
year on the complicated scheduling problems.93
The union felt that the six-cent increase was too small; the com-
pany seemed pleased. 4 At the start of the second year, the six cent
increase plus the arbitrator's cost-of-living formula gave the union
more than it had expected. While the arbitrator's reduction of sick-
leave pay from eight hours to six hours brought minor criticism
from the union in 1956, the reduction was reported to have been
the reason for the arbitrator's release by the union five years later.
The 1965 arbitration award95 not only shows what has hap-
pened to wage rates since 1906 but also reveals that an increasing
number of issues have been resolved by the imparial umpire. Mo-
tormen were paid twenty-one cents per hour in 1906; after a ten-
cent increase in 1965 and another nine-cent increase in 1966, the
operator's rate will be three dollars per hour in addition to a pos-
sible cost-of-living adjustment. Furthermore, the umpire cut the
amount of continuous service required in order to obtain fourteen
days of vacation, from three years to two years. The umpire also
allowed payment for holidays even when they may fall on the em-
ployee's day off, increased the allowance for instruction from fif-
teen cents to twenty cents per hour, and changed the "run money"
amount provided by the company from fifty dollars to seventy-five
dollars." After eighteen days of hearings and after weighing 2000
pages of testimony and 346 exhibits, the umpire made this state-
ment:
It should be understood that the fact that I have refrained from
recommending any particular request -either of the Umon or of
Management does not necessarily imply a lack of intrinsic merit
in such request, but may be due to my conclusion that the eviden-
tial detail presented in these proceedings in support of that request
has been insufficient to persuade me that an affirmative recom-
mendation ought to be made; or it may be due to my belief that
further discussions or negotiations directly between the parties
appear to be in order. However, any omission on my part to
recommend a requested addition to or change in the Conditions of
Employment is intended to be without prejudice to any presenta-
tion of the same or similar request at any appropriate future
time.
9 7
93 Ibd.
94 Subsequently, the arbitrator learned that the parties had tentatively reached an
agreement, prior to arbitration, of seven cents and five cents in a two-year package.
95 From the files of the Cleveland Transit System (unpublished).
06 bId.
97 Cleveland Transit Sys. & Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 268, Summary of
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C. Use by Small Prwate Industry
Arbitration of terms for new contracts may also be used by
small, privately owned-and-operated firms. The following sample
case, Jack & Hezntz Prectsion Indus., Inc...8 was selected because it
ended a costly eleven-week strike and because it showed how easily
the parties can alter, or even reverse, their positions when conditions
warrant such action. This is the type of case that David L. Cole -
labor-relations arbitrator, lawyer, mediator, and statesman - may
have been thinking of when he made the following assertion to a
Rutgers University conference on arbitration:
When an issue over the meaning or application of a contract
provision is submitted to an arbitrator, the procedure is then one
similar to the judicial process. When an arbitrator is caUed upon,
however, to decide what the terms or conditions of a contract
should be, including wage rates and similar matters, we have a
basicaly different situation. Here the parties, unable to convince
one another of their respective views, constitute the arbitrator
their joint agent to decide what their contract should be. In other
words, after considering the facts and arguments, the arbitrator
must determine what in his judgment it would have been fair for
the parties themselves to have agreed upon. Obviously, in the
absence of restrictions in the submission or in the existing agree-
ment, the arbitrator must decide what factors deserve to be con-
sidered and what weight each should have. He must constantly
bear in mind that he is acting as a substitute for the parties them-
selves. The difference between this situation and one in which
he is merely construing a provision of the contract must be ap-
parent. 9
The unresolved issue in the Jack & Hertz case involved seni-
ority for supervisors who were promoted from the ranks. Instead of
opposing seniority, in the management tradition, the company
argued for full and continuing seniority for the promoted supervi-
sor. Instead of insisting that seniority be continued, in the labor
tradition, the union argued, at first, for complete loss of seniority
for the supervisor who had been a union member."' Prior to 1947
the union had bargained for the supervisors (as a part of the pro-
duction unit) and had insisted that they should keep their seniority
rights. Following passage of the Labor Management Relations Act
Recommendations 1 (July 12, 1965) (On file at the office of the Cleveland Transit
System).
98 20 Lab. Arb. 283 (1952).
99 Cole, The Wage Reduction Problem wn Wage Determwaton: A Proposal, 7
AB. J. (n.s.) 134,135 (1952).
100 Jack & Heintz Precision Indus., Inc., 20 Lab. Arb. 285-86 (1952).
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(Taft-Hartley Act),' the union could no longer bargain for the
supervisors nor could it expect them to continue as members. After
weighing the unusual arguments, the arbitrator wrote the new con-
tract section as follows:
A factory supervisor or foreman who was promoted from a job in
the bargaining unit prior to November 1, 1952, shall, for purposes
of transferring back to the ranks within the bargaining unit and
subject to the seniority rules herein contained, retain all seniority
he held on November 1, 1952, plus seniority credit for any addi-
tonal service accumulated after November 1, 1952, and before
October 31, 1953; any factory supervisor or foreman who after
November 1, 1952, was or is promoted from a job in the bargain-
Ing unit shall retain seniority acquired to the date of his transfer
plus seniority credit for any service rendered thereafter not to
exceed a maximum of one additional year.' 02
Many caveats and encouragements about the use of arbitration
for resolving terms of new labor agreements may be found in the
records of other industries and under other laws. Professor Hand-
saker said that in 1959 the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service reported twenty-seven cases in "the following industries:
petroleum, aviation, chemicals, automotive, electrical equipment, re-
tail trade, construction, dairy products, furniture, leather, machinery,
printing and publishing, steel, and transportation."'03 The railroad
transportation industry used many new-contract-writing bodies un-
der the Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA) 104 The all-public-mem-
ber National Mediation Board, after numerous patient and compe-
tent mediation efforts, has, with varying degrees of success, urged
the parties to submit unresolved disputes over terms for new con-
tracts to final and binding arbitration. 0 5 So, too, the Emergency
Boards appointed by the President under the RLA and under the
Taft-Hardey Act have frequently recommended the use of arbitra-
tion.106
101§ 2(3), 61 Star. 137-38 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152 (3) (11) (1964)
102 Jack & Hentz Precision Indus., Inc., 20 Lab. Arb. 283, 288-89 (1952).
103 Handsaker, Arbtratson and Contract Disputes, in CHALLENGES TO ARBniRA-
TION 81-82 (McKelvey ed. 1960). See also MORRISON & HANDSAKEE, THE SUB-
MISSiON AGREiMm IN CONTRACT ARBITRATIoN (1952).
10444 Star. 577, 45 U.S.C. § 8 (1964)
105 Source materials are available in NMB ANNUAL REP. (1935-1966) and in
special reports involving each arbitration board. Professor Herbert R. Northrup, of
the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, has written
extensively, constructively, and critically about labor relations in railway transportation.
100lbtd. See also EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY (Bernstein,
Enarson & Fleming eds. 1955).
1966] 1321
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
III. CONCLUSION
If the preceding discussion has left the impression that the most
important kind of arbitration is that which resolves disputes over new
contracts, it is time to restore perspective. In the research on and
evaluation of arbitration and in the effort to find the best uses for
it, the number of cases of a particular type is not the most impor-
tant criterion. Research for this article suggests that the types of
arbitration have varied with the demands of the times and with the
needs of the industries.
Following Pearl Harbor when spokesmen for labor and man-
agement recommended to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that he
appoint a national war labor board which would have the final re-
sponsibility for resolving all labor disputes, neither they nor he made
any distinction between old and new contracts. Our very best think-
ers and practitioners - lawyers and non-lawyers, professionals and
non-professionals from labor, management, and the public -
searched for and found new ways to resolve all labor disputes. When
the nation's health and life were threatened, the dangers from fail-
ure to resolve labor disputes outweighed the undesirability of placing
limitations on the rights of private parties to make decisions. La-
bor-relations practices have been re-tested; new theories have been
developed and tested in the course of writing terms for new labor
contracts.
It was not an international war, nor the threat of one, which
caused the predecessors of the CTS and the Amalgamated to agree
to arbitration of all unresolved labor disputes in 19056. Nor could
it have been the 1947 Ohio no-strike-by-public employees law"07
which, in 1946, caused the parties to give to an impartial umpire
the ultimate power to rule on all labor disputes. From their records
the parties knew that they could resolve most of their discipline and
old-contract cases. Whether it was concern of the parties for the
strong, negative public reactions to transit strikes at contract time,
whether it was their belief that placing their arguments and evidence
before their own judge was better than having a political appointee
impose a decision on them, or whether it was a blend of these and
other reasons, the company and the umon decided to give their se-
lected umpire the power to write new contract terms for them.
Whatever the future modifications and improvements of their sys-
tem, the fact remains that since 1946, as a result of a collectively
1o7 see OHIo REv. CODE § 4117.02.
1322 [VoL 17" 1302
ARBITRATION OF TERMS
bargained agreement, CTS and the Amalgamated Transit Union
have given the responsibility for writing the terms of their new con-
tracts to impartial umpires in eight of their last eleven agreements' 05
It was not a national crisis which caused Jack & Heintz and the
Machinists to arbitrate their dispute over continued seniority for
promoted supervisors. Rather, it was their awareness that growing
economic losses for both parties made arbitration of that clause for
the new contract preferable to the extension of an eleven-week
strike.'0 9
It is sometimes forgotten that it was a similar kind of reasoning
which led to the use of arbitration. In the late nineteenth and
through the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, labor and man-
agement leaders searched for something which could replace the
costly and mefficient work stoppages as well as the accompanying
pickets and strike-breakers. Some leaders concentrated their atten-
tion on flare-ups over discharges and battles over the principles in-
volved in the application of contract terms. In order to resolve
these disputes in an orderly and far less costly manner, many of them
established grievance procedure ending with final and binding arbi-
tration. They founded the "due process clause of labor relations."'
Instead of asking for, or waiting for, the development of labor
courts, they developed their own procedures. They determined
which disputes should go to arbitration; they selected their judge;
they presented their arguments to him; they agreed that his decision
would be final and binding; they paid him; and they reserved the
right to criticize his decision. When accurate tools are developed
for measuring the contribution which the never-talk-back, whipping-
boy, late arbitrators have made to peaceful resolution of labor dis-
putes, it may be surprising.
The failure to turn to the arbitration of terms for new contracts
by those who have been the most frequent users of discipline and
old-contract arbitration has at times been interpreted as a critism
of the former. Some advocates have cautioned against possible drift
to the former. It would be well to ask why. Could it be, in
part, that the arbitrators' expertise, which has made the latter work
so well, has been utilized in the hard, efficient, and successful nego-
tiations of new contracts? Might it be, in part, that the giants of
108 From the records of the Cleveland Transit System. See Young, Fifty Years of
Labor Arbitration in Cleveland, 83 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 464, 470 (1960).
109 See text accompanying note 103 supra.
110 See YOUNG, UNDERsTANDING LABOR PROBLEMS 128 (1959).
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industry and labor have used competent labor arbitrators as media-
tors in the pre-arbitration process... and that they have found other
ways to bring neutral consultants into the ongoing process of bar-
gaining for new contracts?". 2  Could it be, in part, that when these
methods have grown old, the parties will turn to arbitration of terms
for new contracts? The important thing is that these advocates re-
main responsibly innovative.
There are areas in which arbitration of every kind - but espe-
cially of terms for new contracts - could have a tremendous and
valuable impact. In 1966 there have been strikes by public school
teachers, rumblings by hospital employees, and growing claims of
pay inequalities by policemen and firemen. The warning signs are
loud and clear. Those who must resolve labor disputes in these
critical and sensitive areas have a number of large obstacles to over-
come in the immediate future.
Arbitrators who have been empowered to write the terms for
new contracts know the difficulties. They appreciate Secretary of
Labor W Willard Wirtz's statement that
interpreting a contract is an artisan's job compared with the de-
mand in new contract development for architects. The difference
is between taking things as you find them, and building some-
thing new; between being called upon for answers, and for
ideas."l 3
When there is an increased demand for arbitration of the terms
for new contracts, either at the invitation of the parties or under ex-
isting or new statutes, the body of experience will be enlarged and
improved. There is every reason to believe that when labor lawyers,
economists, or other specialists are requested to apply their expert
knowledge - by working either as part of a lawyer-nonlawyer team
(as with the National Labor Relations Board) or individually -
they will accept the challenge.
I11 For example, General Motors and the United Auto Workers have utilized this
process. See Alexander, Impartial Umpireships: The General Motors - UAW17 Experi-
ence, in ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 108-160 (McKelvey ed. 1959)
112 Kaiser Industries and the United Steel Workers, for example, have employed this
technique. See Chamberlain, Neutral Consultants in Collective Bargaining, in COLLEc-
TiVE BARGAiNhiG AND THE. ARBiTRATOR's ROLE 83-116 (Kahn ed. 1962).
1 13 Wirtz, The Challenge to Free Collective Bargaining, in LABoR ARBiTRATION
AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 308 (Kahn ed. 1963)
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